In this paper I study a model in which households can decide which currency or currencies they will accept. I provide a simple set of assumptions that are sufficient to prevent the indeterminacy of the exchange rate in the sense of Kareken and Wallace (1981) . In a two-country model, stable equilibria have either a single currency or national currencies. I also show currency substitution occurs as an endogenous response to high growth in the stock of a currency.
Because of the foreign exchange cost, all households in the same country will typically accept the same currency. Indeed, they want to minimize their foreign exchange transaction costs and thus prefer to accept the same currency as the majority of other households. When households are assumed to have preferences that introduce a home-country bias, both national currencies and single-currency equilibria exist. Single-currency equilibria Pareto dominate national-currencies equilibria because no resources are wasted in the foreign exchange process.
If the stock of a currency grows "too fast," a national-currencies equilibrium may fail to exist. Suppose households in country i accept currency i and receive cash injections of currency i from a monetary authority, i ϭ 1, 2. If the cash injection is sufficiently large, households can reduce their transactions costs by accepting the foreign currency. The amount of money growth that will induce this switch is lower if the fraction of income spent on foreign goods is "high." This is because households need more foreign currency to make their purchases of foreign goods. An interpretation of this result is that, as trade increases between countries, monetary authorities have less flexibility in choosing the growth rate of the money supply. This result also suggests that countries that have close economic ties are more likely to choose a single currency.
Few papers consider the endogenous choice of currency. Matsui (1998) develops a model where the choice of currency is endogenous but he imposes that taxes must be paid in local currency. Cooper and Kempf (2003, 2004) assume that all sellers in the same country must accept the same currency. Bachetta and van Wincoop (forthcoming) allow sellers to choose the currency they accept but consider an environment with sticky prices.
Many authors have investigated cash-in-advance models of multiple currencies. For example, Minford (1995) studies a cash-in-advance economy based on Lucas (1980) , Boyer and Kingston (1987) study a credit-good, cash-good economy based on Lucas and Stokey (1987) . King, Wallace, and Weber (1992) have a model with two currencies where some types of agents can accept only one type of currency while others may choose which one they accept. Fisher (1999) builds a multiple-currency model that is based on the cash-and-credit framework developed by Schreft (1992) . In all of these cases, the currency that sellers accept is imposed exogenously, and thus the existence of a national currencies equilibrium is assumed rather than derived.
There is a growing literature using search models of money to study multiple currencies. The first generation of such models assumes a limit on how many units of money can be held. It is interesting to compare the model in this paper with those first generation search model, in particular Shi (1995, Section 5) .
1 Both models emphasize the cost of making a transaction. In search models where the upper bound on money holding is unity, agents can only accept one type of currency. When the cost of accepting two currencies is high, as is assumed in this paper, sellers will 1. Other examples include Camera, Craig, and Waller (forthcoming) , Camera and Winkler (2003) , Craig and Waller (1999) , Kocherlakota and Krueger (1999) , Matsuyama, Kiyotaki, and Matsui (1993) , Soller Curtis and Waller (2000) , Ravikumar and Wallace (2001) , Wright (1996, 2001) , and Zhou (1997). only accept one currency. Also, since there is typically no centralized exchange market in search models, the upper bound on money holding means that accepting a unit of currency entails an opportunity cost: an agent holding a given currency may meet an agent who does not accept it. In other words, there is an expected delay until the agent meets somebody who will accept the currency he holds. That cost is in some ways similar to the foreign exchange transaction costs assumed in this paper.
In contrast with the first generation models, Head and Shi (2003) study a search model with divisible money and divisible goods so there is no upper bound. They show that the exchange rate is determinate. Because the search frictions they impose limit arbitrage possibilities, their model also displays violations of the law of one price and of the purchasing power parity.
There has been a lot of work on currency substitution, a survey of which can be found in Giovannini and Turtelboom (1994) . Recent work includes Chang (1994), Siebert and Liu (1998) , Sturzenegger (1997) , Tandon and Wang (1999) , and Uribe (1997) .
A simple model with only one country and two currencies is presented in Section 1. In Section 2 a two-country model is considered and it is shown that national currencies equilibria exist. Section 3 proves that high money growth can lead to currency substitution. Section 4 concludes.
A SIMPLE MODEL WITH TWO CURRENCIES
In this section I study a model with one country and two currencies. I provide simple conditions that are sufficient to eliminate the indeterminacy of the exchange rate. Time is discrete and at each date t, t ≥ 0, a continuum of identical households resides at each location on a circle with a circumference of one. Households are identical and I can consider a representative household at each point of the circle. The representative household in location z, z ʦ [0, 1], is endowed in every period with ω Ͼ 0 units of a nonstorable, location-specific good. At date t ϭ 0, all households hold equal shares of the units of fiat currency outstanding. There are two fiat currencies and the stock of currency i at date t is denoted by M it , i ϭ 1, 2.
The goods from each location on the circle are assumed to be perfect complement in consumption.
2 Without loss of generality, it is assumed that an equal amount of each good is consumed.
3 Let c t denote the quantity of each good consumed by a household. The period utility function is U(c t ), where U is twice differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave. The representative household's objective is to maximize 2. This assumption is extreme but only made for tractability. Results similar to the ones presented in this paper hold if, instead, households have Dixit-Stiglitz preferences.
3. Some goods could be consumed in larger quantities than others as long as the set of such goods is of measure zero. This is ruled out for simplicity.
There is a perfectly competitive goods market at each point of the circle. It is convenient to think of each household as consisting of a seller and a shopper. A cash-in-advance constraint is imposed so that the shopper must use cash for all purchases. 4 The seller stays home and sells a consumption good. Each household chooses whether its seller will accept currency 1, currency 2, or both, knowing that it will receive endowments of the two currencies before there is trade in goods. The shopper travels completely around the circle, buying a good at each point. There is also a centralized market in which households can exchange currencies.
As shown below, the following three assumptions are sufficient to eliminate the indeterminacy of the exchange rate.
Assumption 1: For all t, a household must pay a fixed cost κ if its seller accepts two currencies.
Assumption 2: Foreign exchange transactions are costly. Let m′ 1tϪ1 denote the quantity of currency 1 held by a representative household at the end-of-period t Ϫ 1 and let m 1t denote the quantity of currency 1 held by the household in period t after trading on the foreign exchange market. If m′ 1tϪ1 ≠ m 1t , then the household incurs a real cost equal to ε(1րp t ) |m′ 1tϪ1 Ϫ m 1t |, in terms of the household's endowment good.
Assumption 3:
One can think of the cost κ as the administrative cost of having to deal with a more complicated accounting system. The decision of which currency to accept is taken every period and the cost κ is paid in every period that the household decides its seller will accept two currencies. The cost ε can be thought of as a cost of operating the foreign exchange market that must be paid with every transaction. As will be shown below, Assumption 3 guarantees that it is always less costly to pay the cost of foreign exchange than to pay κ and accept both currencies.
I consider steady-state equilibria in which each good sells for the same price in each currency. Let p t denote the price of a unit of good in currency 1, and let q t denote the price of a unit of good in currency 2 at date t. The money supply grows at a constant rate.
Assumption 4: The money supply for each currency evolves according to
Money is distributed equally to each household by means of helicopter drops. I do not assume preferences for the authority that manages the money supply. I simply consider different levels of π i and their implications.
The timing, in each period, is as follows (Figure 1 ). First, each household forms beliefs about which currencies are accepted by other households. At this time, each household also decides whether it will accept currency 1, currency 2, or both and how 
The Household's Problem
At each date, a household forms expectations about which currency will be accepted at each location.
5 Based on these expectations, the household then chooses how much to consume and whether to accept currency 1, currency 2, or both. Next, the household chooses sequences for consumption, c t , holdings of each type of currency before the goods markets open, m it , and holdings of each type of currency at the close of the goods markets, m′ it , taking prices, p t and q t , as given. Let θ ʦ [0, 1] denote the fraction of locations at which the household uses currency 1 (currency 2 being used everywhere else). I focus on stationary strategies so θ is constant over time.
The problem of a household which chooses to accept only currency 1 can be written as follows
5. It is convenient to assume that all households at the same location accept the same currency. This normalization is without loss of generality. An alternative, and notationally more demanding specification, would be to have a local monopoly at each point of the circle and assume that agents have Dixit-Stiglitz preferences. Results in this paper hold for this alternative model.
All constraints are written in terms of currency 1. Equation (1) states that wealth just before goods markets open, which correspond to holdings of cash denominated in each currency, cannot exceed beginning-of-period wealth. Beginning-of-period wealth is composed of cash held over from last period and injections of new currency. Equations (2) and (3) are identities defining end-of-period holdings of currency 1 and 2, respectively. Equations (4) and (5) are the cash-in-advance constraints for currency 1 and 2, respectively. The last two equations are a nonnegativity constraint and a transversality condition. A similar set of constraints is imposed on households which accept only currency 2.
If a household accepts both currencies, let θ denote the fraction of transactions for which it receives currency 1. Such a household faces the following end-ofperiod cash and cash-in-advance constraints.
θp t c t ϩ (1 Ϫ θ)e t q t c t ≤ m 1t ϩ e t m 2t .
All wealth constraints hold with equality at each date t, since otherwise it would be possible to increase consumption at the date when the inequality is strict without decreasing it for any other date. The cash-in-advance constraints also hold with equality at every date since, by Assumption 4, π i Ͼ β, i ϭ 1, 2.
Equilibrium
Let θ denote the belief of households about the realized value of θ. This paper focuses on symmetric rational-expectations equilibria, meaning all household have the same belief θ and this belief is realized so that θ ϭ θ.
Definition 1: A symmetric, steady-state, rational-expectations equilibrium is a set of constants (c, m′ i , m i , θ), i ϭ 1,2, and a value of p t , q t and e t for each t ≥ 0 for which, given ω, M 10 , M 20 , π 1 and π 2 , (i) households solve the problem described above; (ii) households' beliefs are verified: θ ϭ θ; (iii) the money supply for each currency evolves according to: 
If one of the currencies has no value, the market for that currency clears trivially since there is no cost of holding worthless pieces of paper. In equilibrium, the nominal exchange rate e t satisfies p t ϭ e t q t .
Determinacy of the Exchange Rate
Proposition 1: If κ, ε Ͼ 0, under Assumptions 1-3, there are only three equilibria with valued fiat currency, with either θ ϭ 0, θ ϭ 0.5, or θ ϭ 1. If κ ϭ ε ϭ 0, there are a continuum of equilibria, and the equilibrium exchange rate is indeterminate.
Proof: For a given value of θ, this is just a cash-in-advance economy for which an equilibrium exists (Sargent 1987) . I now show which values of θ are consistent with sellers minimizing the foreign exchange costs of their household.
Given Assumptions 1 and 2, Assumption 3 guarantees that sellers will accept only one currency because it is always less costly to pay the foreign exchange cost than to accept two currencies. Indeed, a household will have to pay ε(1 -θ)c t in foreign exchange costs if its seller accepts currency 1 and εθc t if it accepts currency 2. It always chooses the least costly option. Hence, the foreign exchange cost is a maximum at θ ϭ 0.5 and that maximum is εc t (1ր2). Let fx denote the foreign exchange cost. The condition for the goods markets to clear imposes c t ϩ fx ϭ ω.
ω . If κ is greater than this bound, households will never choose to accept two currencies.
I now show that an equilibrium exists only if θ takes values 0, 0.5, or 1. Consider a household faced with the belief that θ ʦ [0,0.5). To minimize its foreign exchange cost it will choose to accept currency 2 because it makes more purchases with currency 2 than with currency 1. Since this is true of every household, θ must be equal to zero. Conversely, a household faced with the belief that θ ʦ (0.5,1] will choose to accept currency 1. Since this is true for every household, θ must be equal to one. Finally, a household faced with θ ϭ 0.5 is indifferent between choosing currency 1 or 2 because it makes the same amount of purchases with each currency. Since equilibria exist only for θ ϭ 0, θ ϭ 0.5, or θ ϭ 1, Assumptions 1-3 are sufficient to prevent exchange rate indeterminacy.
If κ ϭ ε ϭ 0, then all sellers accept two currencies since it is costless to do so. The indeterminacy of equilibrium exchange rate follows then directly from Kareken and Wallace (1981) . 7 The two currencies are valued only if exactly half the households accept currency 1 and half the households accept currency 2. Otherwise, only one currency will be 6. If some households choose to accept two currencies in equilibrium, then the goods markets' clearing condition for these households is c t ϭ ω Ϫ κ as they do not need to undertake foreign exchange transactions. As shown below, however, Assumption 3 guarantees that households never choose to accept two currencies.
7. In fact it is possible to prove that if only one of Assumptions 1-3 fails to hold, the exchange rate is indeterminate. Details of this proof are available from the author upon request. valued and all households will accept that currency. Everything else being equal, welfare is lower in the mixed currency equilibrium because, each period, goods are being wasted, paying for the transactions costs.
Self-fulfilling expectations are responsible for the existence of only three equilibria. Households choose to accept the same currency they believe the majority of other households will accept. This type of self-fulfilling equilibria is common in monetary economies. For example, it arises in the search literature as the probability that a given agent accepts money depends on whether other agents accept money as well.
It is possible to introduce a notion of stability for the equilibria considered. An equilibrium is unstable if it is not robust to arbitrarily small changes in households' beliefs. Recall, θ denotes households' beliefs about θ.
Proposition 2: Equilibria with θ ϭ 1 and θ ϭ 0 are stable, while equilibrium θ ϭ .5 is unstable.
Proof: As pointed out in the proof of Proposition 1, if θ ʦ [0,0.5), then θ ϭ 0 is the equilibrium. If θ ʦ (0.5,1], then θ ϭ 1 is the equilibrium. This shows that both θ ϭ 0 and θ ϭ 1 are stable. It also implies that θ ϭ 0.5 is unstable since the only value of θ for which it is an equilibrium is θ ϭ 0.5. This section showed one can eliminate exchange rate indeterminacy if foreign exchange transactions are costly (no matter how small the cost is) and if accepting more than one currency is sufficiently costly. In this simple model there is no obvious way of thinking about different countries. All households have the same preferences and consume the same quantities of the same goods. It might not be so surprising, then, that in the stable equilibria only one currency is valued.
TWO COUNTRIES AND TWO CURRENCIES
In this section, the existence of a "national currencies" equilibrium is shown. Some results about currency substitution are presented in the next section. The environment is similar to the one in the previous section, but with two countries (represented by two different circles). Each circle is as described above. Let x tz (y tz ) denote the good available on the first (second) circle in period t at location z. The endowments of these goods are denoted by ω x and ω * y , respectively. 8 There is no market in which households can trade claims for their endowment goods.
If all households had the same preferences, this model would have the same three equilibria as the model in the previous section. In order to have a national currencies equilibrium I assume households in country 1 may have different preferences than households in country 2.
8. A superscript * is used to denote variables pertaining to country 2.
Assumption 5: Preferences of households living in country 1 are represented by
while those living in country 2 have utility functions
where
Think of the γs as capturing home-country bias in consumption. A positive γ i reduces the marginal utility that households in country i get from consuming foreign goods. The larger is γ i , the greater is country i's bias. Attention is restricted to nonnegative γ's, but one could in principle consider negative values of γ 1 and γ 2 . In this case, there would be a foreign country bias. If γ 1 ϭ γ 2 ϭ 0, there is no bias and all households have the same preferences. Another way of thinking of the γs is as a proxy for how open the countries are to trade. More foreign goods are consumed if the γs are low.
New amounts of currency 1 are distributed equally to all households in country 1 while currency 2 is distributed in country 2. There is no market where households can trade claims to newly issued currency. Thus, even if all households had the same preferences, households in countries 1 and 2 would be different because they are endowed with different goods and are issued different currencies.
The laws of evolution for the money supplies, the clearing conditions for the money markets and for the foreign exchange market are the same as in Section 1. The clearing condition for the goods markets is described below.
Throughout this section the assumption that foreign exchange transactions are costly is maintained. Any two households engaged in a foreign exchange transaction pay a cost and each pays its cost in its endowment good. 10 The costs need not be the same for households in country 1 and country 2. Let ε 1 denote the cost paid by households in country 1 in units of good x, and ε 2 denote the cost paid by households in country 2 in units of good y. Let κ 1 and κ 2 denote the cost of accepting two currencies in countries 1 and 2, respectively.
Let p jt and q jt denote the price of good j in units of currencies 1 and 2, respectively, j ϭ x, y. Let θ i denote the proportion of households accepting currency 1 in country i, i ϭ 1, 2. Also, m j it denotes the holdings of currency i by a household that accepts currency j before the date-t goods markets open and m j′ it denotes the holding of currency i by a household that has its seller accepts currency j after the date-t goods markets close, i, j ϭ 1, 2.
As in the previous section, a household forms expectations about which currency other households will accept. Based on these expectations, the household then chooses how much to consume and whether to accept currency 1, currency 2, or 9. Results in this section hold for more general utility functions. Proofs are available from the author upon request.
10. I assume a cost is paid for changes in the amount of currency 1 and of currency 2 in a household's portfolio. Results in this section hold for alternative specifications of the costs as long as all households that transact on the foreign exchange market pay some cost. both. Next, the household chooses sequences for consumption, c t , holdings of each type of currency before the goods markets open, m j it , and holdings of each type of currency at the close of the goods markets, m j′ it , taking prices, p t and q t , as given. There are four different types of households since in each country a household has the choice of accepting either currency 1 or currency 2. The problem for a household in country 1 that accepts currency 1 is
These constraints have the same interpretation as the constraints in Section 1. Only the change in M 1 appears in the wealth constraint since households in country 1 do not receive injections of currency 2. Since the household considered here is from country 1, the first end-of-period cash constraint includes the foreign exchange transactions cost. The problems of the other households are analogous.
The goods markets clear if the foreign and domestic demand for each good is equal to the endowment minus the transactions cost incurred. This can be written as follows:
An equilibrium is defined as in the previous section with these new marketclearing conditions.
For the remainder of the paper I make the following assumption.
Assumption 6: κ 1 , κ 2 , ε 1 , and ε 2 are strictly positive but sufficiently small that they can be ignored from the calculations.
Assumptions 2 and 3 must be modified. They become: Assumption 2′: Foreign exchange transactions are costly: Households in country 1 incur a real cost equal to 
The first-order conditions from the household's problem imply
where the approximations come from the Assumption 6. I can use these expressions to derive the bound in Assumption 3′. The derivation follows the same steps as in Section 1. The foreign exchange costs for a household in country 1 can be written as The household will choose the least costly of the two options, so the foreign exchange cost will be highest when the two costs are equal. This will be the case if (1 -2θ 1 ) ϩ (1 -γ 1 )(1 -2θ 2 ) ϭ 0. It can be verified that, for any combination of θ 1 and θ 2 that satisfy this relationship, the foreign exchange cost will be ε 1 [(2 Ϫ γ 1 )/2]x t . The maximum foreign exchange cost in country 2 is ε 2 [(2 Ϫ γ 2 )/2]y* t . Next, one can show
Ϫ1 ω* y . Substituting these expressions for x t and y* t in the equations describing the foreign exchange cost yields the bounds in Assumption 3′. The definition of equilibrium stability must also be adapted to the two-country model. Let θ 1 and θ 2 denote the common belief of households about the realized values of θ 1 and θ 2 , respectively.
The next proposition shows which values of θ 1 and θ 2 constitute an equilibrium when the stock of both currencies is constant. The study of the effect of growth in the stock of currencies is left for the next section. A national-currencies equilibrium: (iii) θ 1 ϭ 1 and θ 2 ϭ 0.
A reverse national-currencies equilibrium: (iv) θ 1 ϭ 0 and θ 2 ϭ 1.
Five mixed-currencies equilibria: (v) θ 1 ϭ 1ր2 and θ 2 ϭ 1ր2,
All mixed-currencies equilibria are unstable. If either γ 1 ϭ 0 or γ 2 ϭ 0, then the national-currencies equilibrium and reverse national-currencies equilibrium are also unstable.
Proof: Here again for given values of θ 1 and θ 2 there exists an equilibrium for this standard cash-in-advance economy (Sargent 1987) . I look for the values of θ 1 and θ 2 consistent with households minimizing their foreign exchange costs.
There are no transaction costs with a single currency, so θ 1 ϭ θ 2 ϭ 0, and θ 1 ϭ θ 2 ϭ 1 are equilibria.
Since γ 1 , γ 2 ≥ 0, households spend at least as much on home-country goods as on foreign country goods. This means that it is an equilibrium for all domestic households' sellers to accept the same currency, even if all foreign sellers accept the other currency. Thus, candidate equilibria 3 and 7 are equilibria.
If half of the households in both countries accept currency 1, and the other half accept currency 2, then all households are indifferent between the two currencies, and candidate equilibrium 5 is an equilibrium.
Suppose θ 1 ϭ 0 (all households in country 1 accept currency 2). Then the foreign exchange cost of accepting currency 1 in country 2 is (1 Ϫ θ 2 ) q yt y* t ϩ q xt x* t , while the foreign exchange cost of accepting currency 2 in that country is θ 2 p yt y* t .
Households in country 2 are indifferent between the two currencies if the two quantities are equal. Given the Cobb-Douglas utility functions it is easy to show that the two costs are equal if
Thus, candidate equilibrium 2 is an equilibrium. Following the same steps, one can show that candidate equilibria 4, 6, and 8 are equilibria as well.
To see that equilibria 1 and 9 are stable, simply consider {θ 1 ,θ 2 } ϭ {.1,.1} and {θ 1 ,θ 2 } ϭ {.9,.9}. For equilibrium 3, if γ 1 , γ 2 Ͼ 0, then {θ 1 ,θ 2 } ϭ {(γ 1 ր4),1 Ϫ (γ 2 ր4)} proves that it is stable. If either γ 1 ϭ 0 or γ 2 ϭ 0, the equilibrium is no longer stable. If γ 1 ϭ 0, then θ 1 ʦ (0,1] implies that households in country 1 prefer currency 2, and if γ 2 ϭ 0, then θ 2 ʦ [0,1) implies that households in country 2 prefer currency 1. Similar steps prove that equilibrium 7 is stable if γ 1 , γ 2 Ͼ 0, and unstable in either γ 1 ϭ 0 or γ 2 ϭ 0.
Finally, I can show that all other equilibria are unstable. This is clear from the construction of these equilibria, since they depend on households being indifferent between the two currencies in at least one of the countries. Any deviation from the equilibrium values of θ 1 and θ 2 does away with this indifference.
Households try to minimize their foreign exchange cost. With positive home-country biases, households spend more on home goods than on foreign goods and therefore will accept the same currency as the other households in the same country. From the perspective of a given household, the costs assumed in Assumptions 1, 2′, and 3′ create a wedge between the prices paid in each currency. The size of this wedge turns out to be a function of how many households accept one currency or the other.
Some equilibria can be Pareto-ranked because they imply different amounts of goods wasted in transactions costs. Single-currency equilibria imply no transactions cost and thus provide the greatest welfare, while equilibrium 5 gives rise to the highest transactions costs.
All the equilibria are represented in Figure 2 and are denoted by E 1 to E 9 to correspond with Proposition 3. The lines labeled C i , i ϭ 1, 2 represent pairs θ 1 , θ 2 for which households in country i are indifferent between accepting currency 1 and 2. Call C i country i's indifference line, i ϭ 1, 2. The equations for C 1 and C 2 are given by:
ϩ θ 1 , and θ 2 ϭ 2Ϫγ 2 2 ϩ (γ 2 Ϫ 1)θ 1 , respectively. Hence, the slope of these lines is determined by γ 1 and γ 2 , respectively. Consider C 1 . If γ 1 ϭ 0, households in country 1 spend the same amount on good x as they do on good y. Thus, if θ 1 increases, θ 2 has to decrease by the same amount for these households to be indifferent between the two currencies. Thus, the slope of C 1 will be equal to Ϫ1. Suppose now that γ 1 ϭ 1. Then households in country 1 do not buy good y and θ 2 has no influence on their preference for one or the other currency. In that case, C 1 will be vertical. In general, C 1 gets steeper as γ 1 increases. A similar argument shows that C 2 has slope Ϫ1 if γ 2 ϭ 0, gets flatter as γ 2 increases, and becomes horizontal when γ 2 ϭ 1. Points to the left of C i are such that households in country i strictly prefer currency 2, while points to the right of C i are such that households in country i strictly prefer currency 1, i ϭ 1, 2.
Having a home-country bias is important for the stability of the national-currencies equilibrium. If, for example, γ 1 ϭ 0, then equilibria 3 and 9 are identical, and so are equilibria 4 and 7. These equilibria are not stable. If γ 1 ϭ 0, the only stable equilibria have a single valued currency.
A possible alternative interpretation of the γ terms is as a proxy for openness to imports. Under this interpretation, the results imply that, as economies become more open to imports, they are more likely to adopt a single currency. Thus the model provides an explanation of the adoption of the euro. In this theory, the choice of currency depends on the relative amounts spent on different types of goods. This can help us think of what happens in the case of two countries of different sizes. It is expected that, on average, the fraction of a household's spending on goods from a large country will be big, compared with the fraction spent on goods from a small country. In order for a national-currencies equilibrium to exist, the home-country bias in the small country will have to be large. If it is too small, only single-currency equilibria will exist. Starting from a national-currencies equilibrium, as the small country becomes more open to trade, the households in that country may decide to adopt the currency of the big country.
MONEY GROWTH AND CURRENCY SUBSTITUTION
This section considers the effect of money growth on the equilibria of Section 2. Particular attention is paid to currency substitution, by which is meant the switch from a national-currencies to a single-currency equilibrium. 11. There are other definitions of currency substitution. See Giovannini and Turtelboom (1994) for a review.
Recall that currency i is issued by country i, i ϭ 1, 2, and that there is no market in which households can trade claims on newly issued currency. The effect of growth in the stock of a currency is to decrease the incentive to hold that currency for households that live in the country where the currency is issued. Note that there is no real transfer associated with currency growth because prices move to offset any nominal changes. What is happening, instead, is that households get their cash from a different source. If there is no money growth, households get all their cash from sales, whereas with money growth, part of their cash is newly issued currency. This, in turn, changes the amount households must spend on foreign exchange costs in order to obtain their preferred portfolio. For example, consider a national currencies equilibrium. An increase in π 1 increases the share of currency 1 that households in country 1 receive from the monetary authority and reduces the share they obtain through sales. As they rely less on their sales to obtain currency 1, the incentive for sellers to accept currency 1 diminishes. Currency 2 becomes more attractive. Households in country 2 are unaffected by this change.
Graphically, this means that an increase in π 1 shifts the line C 1 , in Figure 2 , to the right while an increase in π 2 shifts the line C 2 to the left. To get some intuition, consider equilibrium of type 9. In such an equilibrium, households in country 1 are indifferent between accepting currency 1 and currency 2. If π 1 increases, households in country 1 are no longer indifferent between the two currencies, because they now receive an extra amount of currency 1. Hence they all prefer currency 2. Only if θ 1 increases will households again be indifferent between the currencies.
As π 1 increases, there will come a point where equilibria 3 and 9 coincide. For any increase in π 1 above that level, equilibrium 3, the national-currencies equilibrium, will fail to exist. If π 2 increases too much, the line C 2 will move to the left. For high enough π 2 , equilibrium 3 will fail to exist. The following proposition gives the precise bounds that trigger currency substitution.
Proposition 4: If either π 1 Ϫ 1 Ͼ γ 1 ր(2 Ϫ γ 1 ), or π 2 Ϫ 1 Ͼ γ 2 ր(2 Ϫ γ 2 ), then the national-currencies equilibrium (E 3 ) fails to exist.
Proof: Assume θ 1 ϭ 1 and θ 2 ϭ 0. In country 1, a household accepting currency 1 must pay (ε 1 րp xt ) e t q yt y t in foreign exchange costs. A household accepting currency 2 must pay (ε 1 րp xt )[p xt x t Ϫ (π 1 Ϫ 1) M 1t ]. As seen in Proposition 3, if π 1 ϭ 1, p xt x t -(π 1 -1)M 1t Ͼ e t q yt y t and it is an equilibrium for sellers in country 1 to accept currency 1.
If π 1 is sufficiently large, the inequality will be reversed and sellers in country 1 will prefer to accept currency 2. The critical value of π 1 is given by (π 1 Ϫ 1) M 1t ϭ p xt x t Ϫ e t q yt y t ϭ γ 1 p xt x t . Hence, sellers in country 1 will prefer to accept currency 2 if (π 1 Ϫ 1) M 1t Ͼ γ 1 p xt x t . Similar steps will establish that if (π 2 Ϫ 1)M 2t Ͼ γ 2 p yt y* t , households in country 2 will prefer currency 1.
To complete the proof, note that ω x ≈ M 1t րp xt and ω y ≈ M 2t րq yt . Also, x t ≈ (1ր2 Ϫ γ 1 )ω x and y* t ≈ (1ր2 Ϫ γ 2 )ω y .
It is interesting to note the role played by the home-country bias. If it is high (γ i high) then it takes faster growth of the currency to get currency substitution to occur. As mentioned above, one can also think of γ i as a proxy for how open country i is to imports. In this case, a high γ i means that country i is not very open to imports, as only a small fraction of its consumption comes from the foreign country. Under this interpretation, Proposition 4 indicates that the monetary authority in a country which is less open to imports has greater freedom to increase the money supply without triggering currency substitution.
It is interesting to note that the reverse national-currencies equilibrium is stable and does not disappear with high money growth.
CONCLUSION
In this paper I study a model in which households can choose the currency or currencies that they accept. I show that once some assumptions are made to eliminate indeterminacy of equilibrium, only stable equilibria have familiar features. All sellers in the same country will accept the same currency. They might accept the same currency as sellers in the foreign country, in which case it is a single-currency equilibrium; or they might accept a different currency, in which case it is a nationalcurrencies equilibrium or a reverse national-currencies equilibrium.
The model predicts that a national-currencies equilibrium might fail to exist if the stock of a currency grows too fast. This can be interpreted as currency substitution. I also show currency substitution is more likely to occur if home-country biases are not too large or, under another interpretation, if countries are more open to trade. Thus, as economic ties between countries grow, we should expect monetary authorities to have less flexibility in choosing high rates of growth for their currencies. For the same reasons, we should expect more countries to choose a single currency, as in Europe. 
